Matthew Schlesinger, is hungry for more (HSP) interface theory of perception.

We've come to the last paper mentioned in the list of learned responses Professor Hoffman shared with me via his “Probing the interface theory of perception: Reply to commentaries, (HSP).  

The interface theory of perception leaves me hungry for more: Commentary on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash, “The interface theory of perception”

Matthew Schlesinger, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1548–1550(2015), September 18, 2015

https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758%2Fs13423-014-0776-1
(full article1400 words)

Abstract

…  Is the theory convincing? I would have to say “almost”; although it certainly has many elements working in its favor, ultimately, I also found that some important questions were ignored or left unanswered,  … 

Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (2014) have ventured into dangerous waters by articulating the idea that perceptual experience is not (necessarily) veridical. They provide support for their provocative claim in a variety of ways (some more convincing than others), …

Overall, I found the argument to be a superb opening shot in what may grow to become a rather contentious debate. …

We got phylogeny and ontogeny!

What a delight to discover that the interface theory of perception not only includes the evolutionary timescale, but also makes room for the developmental timescale. … 

At the very least, this feature means that there is a potential continuity across the two timescales, opening the door to a discussion of multitimescale interactions, including exotic subjects such as heterochrony and the Baldwin effect.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

“opening the door to a discussion of multi-time-scale interactions”  Say what?

I’ve written Professor Schlesinger a couple emails asking if he could explain the concept, and it’s place, in lay terms, but haven’t received a reply, so I’m left guessing.

I don’t recall anything in Hoffman’s book Case Against Reality referring to  ‘multi-time-scale perceptual interactions.’   When I look up the term, there’s all sorts of interesting stuff, such as “entangled time in flocking: multi-time-scale interactions,” among others.  But nothing related to multigenerational perception or Evolution.  

Genetic coding and interactions with changing environments comes to mind, but viewed through the lens of “perceptual interactions over multi-time-scales” seems a non sequitur.  Is it a fancy way of saying the mental processing of varying levels of memory and forethought capabilities?  Could be, but then, why not simply say so?  Who knows?

The thing I do know is that when claims and lofty rhetoric overwhelms my senses and leaves my head spinning, with nothing to build upon.  I pull back to what I do understand and that always takes me back to knowledge attained through Earth sciences and biology.  

The breath and depth of the current scientific understanding within a simple pragmatic physicalist* paradigm is awesome (*before all the over-wrought handwringing takes over).  Heck, it even invites mystical experiences far superior to what can be achieved sitting in a monastic cell.  

Get out into dark skies, sit on the edge of Earth, gazing at a crescent moon, with the sun over the horizon and some planets in view, imagining their orbits, looking beyond into the milky way, thinking about the Voyagers and other manmade spacecraft and all we've learned about those worlds.  The deeper your understanding becomes, the more vivid your mind's eye.

Achieving a momentarily visceral awareness of those objects in time and space, now that get's about as mystical as a human could hope for.  Or the other direction, inward voyages, into your own body that are possible given today's medical understanding and imaging capability.  All it takes is doing your homework and sincere curiosity.

If we're going to spend all day within our mindscapes, why not spend energy on those sorts of constructive down to Earth pursuits?  Thoughts and ideas that can lead to constructive outcomes. At least that's what I'll be arguing for in future installments.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Tangled Tree: A Radical New History of Life, by David Quammen

Science writer David Quammen explains how recent discoveries in molecular biology can change our understanding of evolution and life’s history, with powerful implications for human health and even our own human nature. … 

The pioneering work of Carl Woese.   (Goodreads)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

A New View of Evolution That Can’t Be Represented by a Tree

By Erika Check Hayden, New York Times Book Review, August 13, 2018

… Quammen’s sprawling history of evolutionary genetics ranges widely in its answer to that question. He synthesizes a large quantity of disparate material, circling repeatedly back to one scientist in particular: Carl Woese, whose work both fleshed out Darwin’s tree and laid the foundations for its uprooting. …

Zygmunt Pizlo, Philosophizing cannot substitute for experimentation: comment on Hoffman, Singh & Prakash (2014)

 Zygmunt Pizlo:  “I am an “expert” on 3D shape perception, so I will confine my comments about veridicality to shape. Unlike Hoffman et al., I do not have the temerity required to discuss veridicality in vision in general, as well as in smell, taste, touch and hearing in such varied species as humans, bees, and spiders.”

“… Any contemporary use of a Motor Theory of Perception, and this includes Hoffman et al.’s explanation of 3D shape perception, can be viewed as a legacy of psychology’s Dark Age called “Radical Behaviorism”. This is precisely what Hoffman et al. are offering us. As for me, “no, thank you very much.”

Zygmunt Pizlo’s paper does a wonderfully concise job of bringing Hoffman’s “veridicality” challenge back down to Earth and our three dimensional world.  This paper was 1200 words long and I whittled to 500 some odd.  Please visit the complete article for all the details. 

Philosophizing cannot substitute for experimentation: comment on Hoffman, Singh & Prakash (2014)

• Zygmunt Pizlo, September 18, 2015 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1546–1547 (2015)

Abstract  

The perception of a 3D shape must be excluded from Hoffman et al.’s “interface theory” primarily because shape is characterized by its symmetries. When these symmetries are used as a priori constraints, 3D shapes are always recovered from 2D retinal images veridically. 

These facts make it clear that 3D shape perception is completely different from, as well as more important than, all other perceptions because the veridicality of our perception of 3D shapes (and 3D scenes) accounts for our successful adaptation to the natural environment.

… when we talk about veridical 3D perception, we are referring to our natural visual space, that is, a space with natural, symmetrical objects residing, as they naturally do, on a common ground because of gravity. 

The concept of an “empty” visual space, used in laboratories, that contains only a few isolated points of light in total darkness, or a few objects floating in the air, no matter how attractive mathematically, is actually empty from an empirical, as well as from a computational, point of view. …

McLaughlin + Green, Are Hoffman’s Icons Sense Data?

Brian McLaughlin and E.J. Green: "We contend that, contrary to what Hoffman et al. claim, the perceptual icons posited by interface theory seem best taken to be sense data."

 "The brain, of course, is a complex middle-sized physical object. As such, HSP must hold that it does not exist. But if the brain does not exist, then where are visual computations carried out? HSP offer no answer to this question.”

"… We can’t justifiably appeal to evidence obtained from particle accelerators, for instance, without presupposing that there are particle accelerators."

"... We part company with HSP, however, when they tell us: “the language of space-time and physical objects is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the objective world.”

I’m grateful to Brian P. McLaughlin and E.J. Green for taking a closer look at Hoffman’s “Icons” in a way no one else has.  They’ve done an excellent job of detailing the logical and scientific fallacies within Hoffman's "icons" notion.  

Are icons sense data?

• Brian P. McLaughlin & E. J. Green 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, September 18, 2015

volume 22, pages 1541–1545 (2015)

(Original article 4000 words)

Abstract

We argue that Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (Psychon Bull Rev, this issue) have not made the case that "the language of space-time and physical objects is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the objective world." 

Further, we contend that, contrary to what Hoffman et al. claim, the perceptual icons posited by interface theory seem best taken to be sense data.

As Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (2014) (hereafter, HSP) point out, Palmer expresses the orthodox view in vision theory when he states:

Evolutionarily speaking, visual perception is useful only if it is reasonably accurate…Indeed, vision is useful precisely because it is so accurate. By and large, what you see is what you get. When this is true, we have what is called veridical perception. (1999, 6)

Jacob Feldman, Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash.

   

Jacob Feldman:  “On that narrow question, it seems to me that Hoffman et al.’s position cannot be disputed: evolution favors fitness, not truth, beauty, or anything else except insofar as it is correlated with fitness. 

This is literally tautological in the context of Darwinian evolution, as it is essentially a restatement of what is meant by “fitness”—that which is favored by adaptive pressure. …”

Jacob Feldman,  Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, focuses on Hoffman's “truth,” and it sure seems like he's agreeing with my layperson assessment that Hoffman's "truth" in ITP is a deception.  I encourage you to see if you agree with my assessment of Feldman's short paper “Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash,” the original comes in at 1800 words, and here I’ve trimmed it to 500 words worth of highlights that I hope encourage you to read Professor Heldman's entire paper.

Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash

• Jacob Feldman,  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1523–1525 (2015),  September 18, 2015

Abstract

Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (in press) argue that veridicality is neither required nor achieved by the visual system, and propose a new framework in which the literal truth of perceptual inferences plays no role. In this brief comment, I concur with and advocate their basic position, though I go on to argue that Bayesian inference already embodies a similar epistemological stance.

That “vision usually provides us with a veridical representation of the world” is a cliche so hoary that we vision scientists hardly stop to think about whether it is actually true. 

Hoffman et al. (in press) ask us to consider it a bit more carefully. Could such a truism actually be wrong?

It’s worse than wrong—it’s meaningless.

… Certainly, as Hoffman et al. would agree, the visual system does an exemplary job at resolving the ambiguity. But does it do so by giving us something true, or simply something useful? Or is this a distinction without a difference?

Shimon Edelman, Varieties of perceptual truth, possible evolutionary roots.

At one point in my critique I mentioned that Hoffman’s “veridicality” arguments were a smoke screen.   

Shimon Edelman promises to lend learned support to my position, but the paper is behind a paywall, and I’m focused on catching up with Hoffman’s list, so I’ll simply give it a mention and move along.  

I’m sure, if a student where interested enough to send him an email and request one, that Professor Edelman would be happy to send you a free reprint.  At least in my experience scientists have been helpful with responses and surprisingly generous with sharing theirs papers that are behind a paywall.  (Let him know Cc sent you.)

Varieties of perceptual truth and their possible evolutionary roots

• Shimon Edelman 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1519–1522(2015).  October 11, 2014

Abstract

Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (2014) observe that perception evolves to serve as an interface between the perceiver and the world and proceed to reason that percepts need not, or even cannot, resemble their objects. 

I accept their premise, but argue that there are interesting ways in which perception can be truthful, with regard not to “objects” but to relations, 

and that evolutionary pressure is expected to favor rather than rule out such veridicality.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Index

Cc’s Students’ Study Guide for The Case Against Reality. 

  

  

I intend to be a witness for a fact based DeepTime, 

Evolutionary perspective on our “human mind” -“physical reality” interface.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Donald Hoffman Playing Basketball in Zero-Gravity, a critical review of, The Case Against Reality:  Why Evolution Hid The Truth From Our Eyes, by Donald Hoffman, ©2019, W.W.Norton Company

(1.01)  The Prelude, Prof Donald Hoffman Playing Basketball In Zero-Gravity

(1.02)  Chapter 10a, Community: The Network of Conscious Agents (1/3)

(1.03)  Chapter 10b, Community: The Network of Conscious Agents (2/3)

(1.04)  Chapter 10c, Cmty: Network of Hoffmanian Conscious Agents (3/3)

(1.05)  Chapter 1, Mystery: The Scalpel That Split Consciousness

(1.06)  Chapter 2, Beauty: Siren of the Gene

(1.07)  Chapter 3, Reality: Capers of the Unseen Sun

(1.08)  Chapter 4, Sensory: Fitness beats Truth

(1.09)  Chapter 5, Illusory: The Bluff of the Desktop

(1.10)  Chapter 6, Gravity: Spacetime is Doomed

(1.11)  Chapter 7, Virtuality: Inflating a Holoworld

(1.12)  Chapter 8, Polychromy: Mutations of an Interface

(1.13)  Chapter 9, Scrutiny: You Get What You Need, in Both Life and Business

(1.14)  Appendix,  Precisely: The Right to Be (Foolish)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Hoffman/Prakash’s Objects of Consciousness, Objections and Replies

Frontiers in Psychology - June 17, 2014

(2.01)  4/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness,  (conclusion)

(2.02)  1/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness, questions + replies (1-12)

(2.03)  2/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness, questions + replies (13-17)

(2.04)  3/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness, questions + replies (18-21)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

(3.01)  Diary - But, wait!  There's more.  Ten Learned Responses:

“Probing the interface theory of perception: Reply to commentaries, Donald D. Hoffman, Manish Singh & Chetan Prakash" 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. volume 22, pages1551–1576(2015)

Abstract

We propose that selection favors nonveridical perceptions that are tuned to fitness. Current textbooks assert, to the contrary, that perception is useful because, in the normal case, it is veridical. Intuition, both lay and expert, clearly sides with the textbooks. We thus expected that some commentators would reject our proposal and provide counterarguments that could stimulate a productive debate. ...

(3.02)  Barton Anderson - Where does fitness fit in theories of perception? 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0748-5

(3.03)  Jonathan Cohen - Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0782-3

(3.04)  Shimon Edelman - Varieties of perceptual truth and their possible evolutionary roots. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0741-z

(3.05)  Jacob Feldman - Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0795-y

(3.06)  Chris Fields -Reverse engineering the world: a commentary on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash, 

“The interface theory of perception”. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0742-y

(3.07)  Jan Koenderink - Esse est Percipi & Verum est Factum. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0754-7

(3.08)  Rainer Mausfeld - Notions such as “truth” or “correspondence to the objective world” play no role in explanatory accounts of perception. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0763-6

(3.09)  Brian P. McLaughlin and E. J. Green - Are icons sense data? 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0780-5

(3.10)  Zygmunt Pizlo - Philosophizing cannot substitute for experimentation: comment on Hoffman, Singh & Prakash. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0760-9

(3.11)  Matthew Schlesinger - Interface theory of perception leaves me hungry for more. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0776-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Student Resources - Background info:

(4.01)  Rainer Mausfeld: ‘Truth’ has no role in explanatory accounts of perception.
(4.02)  Paul Mealing: considers Hoffman's "Objects of Consciousness.”
(4.03)  The Case For Reality: Because Apparently Someone Needs to Make One
(4.04)  Sabine Hossenfelder in Defense of Scientific Realism and Physical Reality
(4.05)  "Emergence" - A Handy Summary and Resources
(4.06)  Physical Origins of Mind - Dr. Siegel, Allen Institute Brain Science, Tononi, Koch.
(4.07)  Can you trust Frontiers in Psychology research papers?  Students' Resource
(4.08)  Critical Thinking Skills - In Defense of Reality - A Student Resource
(4.09)  Philo+Sophia - Love of Wisdom - A Student Resource

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

        

(5.01)    Summary, 

explaining why I pursued this project.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Dr. Mark Solms deftly demystifies Chalmers’ “Hard Problem” of Consciousness, while incidentally highlighting why Hoffman’s “Conscious Agents” are luftgeschäft. 

(6.01)  Dr. Mark Solms demystifies Chalmers' "Hard Problem" of Consciousness.

(6.02)  The Other Side of Dr. Mark Solms, farmer, vintner, humanitarian.

(6.03)  Students’ Resource: A representative cross-section of Dr. Mark Solms' scientific publications.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

My homemade philosophical underpinning . . . 

 

(7.01)  An Alternative Philosophical Perspective - “Earth Centrism”     
(7.02)  Appreciating the Physical Reality ~ Human Mindscape divide          
(7.03)  Being an element in Earth’s Pageant of Evolution

(7.04)  It’s not a “Body-Mind Problem,”  it’s an “Ego-God Problem.”

Feel free to copy and share

WhatsUpWithThatWatts.blogspot.com

Email: citizenschallenge  gmail  com

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

Jan Koenderink, "Esse est percipi - verum factum est" - Considering Hoffman's case.

 Defending Physical Reality, because apparently somebody needs to. 

"Esse est percipi & verum factum est"

Philosophy has and will continue to resemble a dog chasing its tail, 

in contrast to science’s hound sniffing out its quarry.

Updated with a learned perspective on philosophy, scroll to bottom for video: 

Dr. Richard Carrier, at Skepticon 6.  It’s titled “Is Philosophy Stupid?”

Considering, "Esse est percipi & verum factum est"

(It is perceived to be & It is true)

Jan Koenderink,  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1530–1534(2015). September 18, 2015

(original 2800 words)

I've read a little bit about Jan Koenderink, no doubt he's a brilliant man with many impressive accomplishments.  I can't hold a candle to this master of academia.  Nor is my intention to dismiss him.  But, fact remains this particular paper says much worth disputing.  For me, it's another example of what I refer to as getting lost within one's own Mindscape and losing sight of physical reality. 

 

The following is intended for students who think something is being missed by the masters.  Students curious and motivated to do their own homework, to figure it out for themselves.

Abstract

I go into the historical roots of the fundamental issues relating to the “interface theory of perception,” concentrating on the sciences rather than on philosophy. …

I am mainly in sympathy with the concepts discussed in the target article. I have often used the “interface paradigm” myself (Koenderink, 2011, 2013) in vain attempts to kick people out of their mainstream slumber. The rare reactions, however, have been negative (e.g., Tyler, 2014). I foresee some frictions in getting the ideas of the authors accepted!

Yet the basic notions are hardly revolutionary. They occur in philosophy—that is, proto-science—from the earliest days, …

I find it interesting how Koenderink injects “Proto-science.” 

Yes, philosophy gave birth to science.  (oops)

In philosophy, the coin of realm is rhetorical abilities.  

In science, the coin of the realm is honest observations and constructive learning.

Philosophy has no standards of objectivity beyond the writer's imagination and the ability to argue effectively.  

Reality

The English word “reality” might be translated into German as either Realität or Wirklichkeit. This German distinction reveals a basic dichotomy. One reality is your awareness here and now, whereas the other reality is sometimes referred to as the physical world.  …

This is where I believe it’s appropriate to step outside our imagined ‘god's eye view’ and recognize our physical reality from the perspective of the creature within us.  

The simple fact of us existing requires that we are a product of an unfathomably ancient evolutionary process.  Nothing else makes rational or emotional sense.

That being the case, there is a physical reality that is ultimate, that simply is, and in some fundamental ways it has nothing to do humans, we just happen to be an incredibly lucky fluke.  Billions of years worth of incredibly advantageous breaks.  Very much like all the other creatures we share Earth with today, but we're the epitome of complexity.

It feels to me like Koenderink and Hoffman and the like have lost sight of that fundament reality we were born into.  I suspect because they are blinded by the brilliance of their own minds.