Zygmunt Pizlo, Philosophizing cannot substitute for experimentation: comment on Hoffman, Singh & Prakash (2014)

 Zygmunt Pizlo:  “I am an “expert” on 3D shape perception, so I will confine my comments about veridicality to shape. Unlike Hoffman et al., I do not have the temerity required to discuss veridicality in vision in general, as well as in smell, taste, touch and hearing in such varied species as humans, bees, and spiders.”

“… Any contemporary use of a Motor Theory of Perception, and this includes Hoffman et al.’s explanation of 3D shape perception, can be viewed as a legacy of psychology’s Dark Age called “Radical Behaviorism”. This is precisely what Hoffman et al. are offering us. As for me, “no, thank you very much.”

Zygmunt Pizlo’s paper does a wonderfully concise job of bringing Hoffman’s “veridicality” challenge back down to Earth and our three dimensional world.  This paper was 1200 words long and I whittled to 500 some odd.  Please visit the complete article for all the details. 

Philosophizing cannot substitute for experimentation: comment on Hoffman, Singh & Prakash (2014)

• Zygmunt Pizlo, September 18, 2015 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1546–1547 (2015)

Abstract  

The perception of a 3D shape must be excluded from Hoffman et al.’s “interface theory” primarily because shape is characterized by its symmetries. When these symmetries are used as a priori constraints, 3D shapes are always recovered from 2D retinal images veridically. 

These facts make it clear that 3D shape perception is completely different from, as well as more important than, all other perceptions because the veridicality of our perception of 3D shapes (and 3D scenes) accounts for our successful adaptation to the natural environment.

… when we talk about veridical 3D perception, we are referring to our natural visual space, that is, a space with natural, symmetrical objects residing, as they naturally do, on a common ground because of gravity. 

The concept of an “empty” visual space, used in laboratories, that contains only a few isolated points of light in total darkness, or a few objects floating in the air, no matter how attractive mathematically, is actually empty from an empirical, as well as from a computational, point of view. …

McLaughlin + Green, Are Hoffman’s Icons Sense Data?

Brian McLaughlin and E.J. Green: "We contend that, contrary to what Hoffman et al. claim, the perceptual icons posited by interface theory seem best taken to be sense data."

 "The brain, of course, is a complex middle-sized physical object. As such, HSP must hold that it does not exist. But if the brain does not exist, then where are visual computations carried out? HSP offer no answer to this question.”

"… We can’t justifiably appeal to evidence obtained from particle accelerators, for instance, without presupposing that there are particle accelerators."

"... We part company with HSP, however, when they tell us: “the language of space-time and physical objects is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the objective world.”

I’m grateful to Brian P. McLaughlin and E.J. Green for taking a closer look at Hoffman’s “Icons” in a way no one else has.  They’ve done an excellent job of detailing the logical and scientific fallacies within Hoffman's "icons" notion.  

Are icons sense data?

• Brian P. McLaughlin & E. J. Green 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, September 18, 2015

volume 22, pages 1541–1545 (2015)

(Original article 4000 words)

Abstract

We argue that Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (Psychon Bull Rev, this issue) have not made the case that "the language of space-time and physical objects is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the objective world." 

Further, we contend that, contrary to what Hoffman et al. claim, the perceptual icons posited by interface theory seem best taken to be sense data.

As Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (2014) (hereafter, HSP) point out, Palmer expresses the orthodox view in vision theory when he states:

Evolutionarily speaking, visual perception is useful only if it is reasonably accurate…Indeed, vision is useful precisely because it is so accurate. By and large, what you see is what you get. When this is true, we have what is called veridical perception. (1999, 6)

Jacob Feldman, Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash.

   

Jacob Feldman:  “On that narrow question, it seems to me that Hoffman et al.’s position cannot be disputed: evolution favors fitness, not truth, beauty, or anything else except insofar as it is correlated with fitness. 

This is literally tautological in the context of Darwinian evolution, as it is essentially a restatement of what is meant by “fitness”—that which is favored by adaptive pressure. …”

Jacob Feldman,  Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, focuses on Hoffman's “truth,” and it sure seems like he's agreeing with my layperson assessment that Hoffman's "truth" in ITP is a deception.  I encourage you to see if you agree with my assessment of Feldman's short paper “Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash,” the original comes in at 1800 words, and here I’ve trimmed it to 500 words worth of highlights that I hope encourage you to read Professor Heldman's entire paper.

Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash

• Jacob Feldman,  Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1523–1525 (2015),  September 18, 2015

Abstract

Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (in press) argue that veridicality is neither required nor achieved by the visual system, and propose a new framework in which the literal truth of perceptual inferences plays no role. In this brief comment, I concur with and advocate their basic position, though I go on to argue that Bayesian inference already embodies a similar epistemological stance.

That “vision usually provides us with a veridical representation of the world” is a cliche so hoary that we vision scientists hardly stop to think about whether it is actually true. 

Hoffman et al. (in press) ask us to consider it a bit more carefully. Could such a truism actually be wrong?

It’s worse than wrong—it’s meaningless.

… Certainly, as Hoffman et al. would agree, the visual system does an exemplary job at resolving the ambiguity. But does it do so by giving us something true, or simply something useful? Or is this a distinction without a difference?

Shimon Edelman, Varieties of perceptual truth, possible evolutionary roots.

At one point in my critique I mentioned that Hoffman’s “veridicality” arguments were a smoke screen.   

Shimon Edelman promises to lend learned support to my position, but the paper is behind a paywall, and I’m focused on catching up with Hoffman’s list, so I’ll simply give it a mention and move along.  

I’m sure, if a student where interested enough to send him an email and request one, that Professor Edelman would be happy to send you a free reprint.  At least in my experience scientists have been helpful with responses and surprisingly generous with sharing theirs papers that are behind a paywall.  (Let him know Cc sent you.)

Varieties of perceptual truth and their possible evolutionary roots

• Shimon Edelman 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1519–1522(2015).  October 11, 2014

Abstract

Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (2014) observe that perception evolves to serve as an interface between the perceiver and the world and proceed to reason that percepts need not, or even cannot, resemble their objects. 

I accept their premise, but argue that there are interesting ways in which perception can be truthful, with regard not to “objects” but to relations, 

and that evolutionary pressure is expected to favor rather than rule out such veridicality.

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Index

Cc’s Students’ Study Guide for The Case Against Reality. 

  

  

I intend to be a witness for a fact based DeepTime, 

Evolutionary perspective on our “human mind” -“physical reality” interface.

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Donald Hoffman Playing Basketball in Zero-Gravity, a critical review of, The Case Against Reality:  Why Evolution Hid The Truth From Our Eyes, by Donald Hoffman, ©2019, W.W.Norton Company

(1.01)  The Prelude, Prof Donald Hoffman Playing Basketball In Zero-Gravity

(1.02)  Chapter 10a, Community: The Network of Conscious Agents (1/3)

(1.03)  Chapter 10b, Community: The Network of Conscious Agents (2/3)

(1.04)  Chapter 10c, Cmty: Network of Hoffmanian Conscious Agents (3/3)

(1.05)  Chapter 1, Mystery: The Scalpel That Split Consciousness

(1.06)  Chapter 2, Beauty: Siren of the Gene

(1.07)  Chapter 3, Reality: Capers of the Unseen Sun

(1.08)  Chapter 4, Sensory: Fitness beats Truth

(1.09)  Chapter 5, Illusory: The Bluff of the Desktop

(1.10)  Chapter 6, Gravity: Spacetime is Doomed

(1.11)  Chapter 7, Virtuality: Inflating a Holoworld

(1.12)  Chapter 8, Polychromy: Mutations of an Interface

(1.13)  Chapter 9, Scrutiny: You Get What You Need, in Both Life and Business

(1.14)  Appendix,  Precisely: The Right to Be (Foolish)

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Hoffman/Prakash’s Objects of Consciousness, Objections and Replies

Frontiers in Psychology - June 17, 2014

(2.01)  4/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness,  (conclusion)

(2.02)  1/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness, questions + replies (1-12)

(2.03)  2/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness, questions + replies (13-17)

(2.04)  3/4_Hoffman, Objects of Consciousness, questions + replies (18-21)

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(3.01)  Diary - But, wait!  There's more.  Ten Learned Responses:

“Probing the interface theory of perception: Reply to commentaries, Donald D. Hoffman, Manish Singh & Chetan Prakash" 

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. volume 22, pages1551–1576(2015)

Abstract

We propose that selection favors nonveridical perceptions that are tuned to fitness. Current textbooks assert, to the contrary, that perception is useful because, in the normal case, it is veridical. Intuition, both lay and expert, clearly sides with the textbooks. We thus expected that some commentators would reject our proposal and provide counterarguments that could stimulate a productive debate. ...

(3.02)  Barton Anderson - Where does fitness fit in theories of perception? 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0748-5

(3.03)  Jonathan Cohen - Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0782-3

(3.04)  Shimon Edelman - Varieties of perceptual truth and their possible evolutionary roots. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0741-z

(3.05)  Jacob Feldman - Bayesian inference and “truth”: a comment on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0795-y

(3.06)  Chris Fields -Reverse engineering the world: a commentary on Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash, 

“The interface theory of perception”. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0742-y

(3.07)  Jan Koenderink - Esse est Percipi & Verum est Factum. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0754-7

(3.08)  Rainer Mausfeld - Notions such as “truth” or “correspondence to the objective world” play no role in explanatory accounts of perception. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0763-6

(3.09)  Brian P. McLaughlin and E. J. Green - Are icons sense data? 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0780-5

(3.10)  Zygmunt Pizlo - Philosophizing cannot substitute for experimentation: comment on Hoffman, Singh & Prakash. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0760-9

(3.11)  Matthew Schlesinger - Interface theory of perception leaves me hungry for more. 

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0776-

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Student Resources - Background info:

(4.01)  Rainer Mausfeld: ‘Truth’ has no role in explanatory accounts of perception.
(4.02)  Paul Mealing: considers Hoffman's "Objects of Consciousness.”
(4.03)  The Case For Reality: Because Apparently Someone Needs to Make One
(4.04)  Sabine Hossenfelder in Defense of Scientific Realism and Physical Reality
(4.05)  "Emergence" - A Handy Summary and Resources
(4.06)  Physical Origins of Mind - Dr. Siegel, Allen Institute Brain Science, Tononi, Koch.
(4.07)  Can you trust Frontiers in Psychology research papers?  Students' Resource
(4.08)  Critical Thinking Skills - In Defense of Reality - A Student Resource
(4.09)  Philo+Sophia - Love of Wisdom - A Student Resource

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(5.01)    Summary, 

explaining why I pursued this project.

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Dr. Mark Solms deftly demystifies Chalmers’ “Hard Problem” of Consciousness, while incidentally highlighting why Hoffman’s “Conscious Agents” are luftgeschäft. 

(6.01)  Dr. Mark Solms demystifies Chalmers' "Hard Problem" of Consciousness.

(6.02)  The Other Side of Dr. Mark Solms, farmer, vintner, humanitarian.

(6.03)  Students’ Resource: A representative cross-section of Dr. Mark Solms' scientific publications.

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My homemade philosophical underpinning . . . 

 

(7.01)  An Alternative Philosophical Perspective - “Earth Centrism”     
(7.02)  Appreciating the Physical Reality ~ Human Mindscape divide          
(7.03)  Being an element in Earth’s Pageant of Evolution

(7.04)  It’s not a “Body-Mind Problem,”  it’s an “Ego-God Problem.”

Feel free to copy and share

WhatsUpWithThatWatts.blogspot.com

Email: citizenschallenge  gmail  com

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Jonathan Cohen: Perceptual representation, veridicality, interface theory

"Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception" 

 Professor Cohen: “But HSP’s case against veridical perception, and their case for an alternative account, turn crucially on significant misapprehensions in the early going about what veridicality amounts to. ...” 

“Finally, it would seem that Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash’s supposedly alternative, 'interface' picture of perception is in fact no less committed to veridical perceptual representation than the views they aim for it to replace. ..."

“... In the end, I’ll conclude, HSP give us no reasons to abandon the standard view that perception veridically represents the world.”       Jonathan Cohen 

“Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception,” another paper, another perspective, another impressive thought provoking read that I liked because it resonated with my own ideas on the matter.

Cohen’s paper weighs in at 5500 words and my first culling for highlights, came in at 1800 words.  After a few rereads and some brutal deletions, I have this summary down to <500 words worth of highlights (food for thought) that I hope will encourage you to read the entire paper.  It's open access

In for a nickel, in for a dollar.

I thought I had finished with this review section of my “Hoffman playing basketball in zero gravity” and that my last act, before move on, was to send a short email to professor Hoffman asking if he’d responded to Dr. Mausfeld’s critique.  That netted me nine additional studies courtesy of Hoffman, now I feel obliged to read through them, and to share highlights from those that resonate with the points I was trying to get across during my book review.  

That's because I want this students guide to include as many informative expert voices as I can find, so please bear with me.

What am I trying to accomplished with all this?  (Continued below Cohen’s quotes.)

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Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception

• Jonathan Cohen, published October 15, 2015

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

volume 22, pages 1512–1518(2015)

doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0782-3

Abstract

Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (henceforth, HSP) … put forward an alternative “interface” theory, on which perception is an adaptively useful but truth-obscuring veil between perceiver and perceived. But HSP’s case against veridical perception, and their case for an alternative account, turn crucially on significant misapprehensions in the early going about what veridicality amounts to. 

In this paper I’ll identify this mistake, and then argue that it both undercuts HSP’s arguments against perceptual veridicality 

and prevents them from seeing that their own preferred conception of perception is itself committed to veridical representation, rather than an alternative to it.